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Abstract This paper proposes the use of restructuring information about choices
to improve the performance of computer agents on recurring sequentially depen-
dent decisions. The intended situations of use for the restructuring methods it
denes are website platforms such as electronic marketplaces in which agents typ-
ically engage in sequentially dependent decisions. With the proposed methods,
such platforms can improve agents' experience, thus attracting more customers
to their sites. In sequentially-dependent-decisions settings, decisions made at one
time may aect decisions made later; hence, the best choice at any point de-
pends not only on the options at that point, but also on future conditions and
the decisions made in them. This \problem restructuring" approach was tested on
sequential economic search, which is a common type of recurring sequentially de-
pendent decision-making problem that arises in a broad range of areas. The paper
introduces four heuristics for restructuring the choices that are available to deci-
sion makers in economic search applications. Three of these heuristics are based
on characteristics of the choices, not of the decision maker. The fourth heuristic
requires information about a decision-makers prior decision-making, which it uses
to classify the decision-maker. The classication type is used to choose the best of
the three other heuristics. The heuristics were extensively tested on a large number
of agents designed by dierent people with skills similar to those of a typical agent
developer. The results demonstrate that the problem-restructuring approach is a
promising one for improving the performance of agents on sequentially dependent
decisions. Although there was a minor degradation in performance for a small
portion of the agents, the overall and average individual performance improved
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substantially. Complementary experimentation with people demonstrated that the
methods carry over, to some extent, also to human decision makers. Interestingly,
the heuristic that adapts based on a decision-maker's history achieved the best
results for computer agents, but not for people.
Keywords Decision Making  Sequentially Dependent Decisions  Platform
Design  Experimentation
1 Introduction
Some decisions people face are choices among a clear set of options, for instance
the choice of which jam to buy at the supermarket or between purchasing a high-
wind umbrella or a small collapsible one. We will refer to this type of decision as
a \decision simpliciter" because it is not adorned by any accompanying decisions.
Other decisions come in clusters, for example the choice of wearing a black suit
and black shoes rather than a brown suit with brown shoes. This paper considers a
third type of decision, which we call \sequentially dependent decisions". Decisions
of this type occur in sequences with decision n being aected by some of decisions
1:::n   1. For instance, a decision about whether to take an umbrella will aect
the decision of whether to take a bus or taxi if it begins to rain while walking
toward the bus stop. With sequentially dependent decisions, each decision exerts
both immediate and long-term inuence. As a result, the best choice at any point
depends not only on the options at that point, but also on future conditions and
the decisions made in them [53]. It is thus more dicult to dene (and to compute)
metrics for goodness of decision or decision-making performance.
A signicant body of work on decisions simpliciter has shown a range of cog-
nitive inuences on people's decision making that lead them to make decisions
that are \suboptimal" in the sense that their choices do not align with their pref-
erences [9]. For instance, people may be overwhelmed by too many choices [76],
and they do better with opt-out than opt-in policies [85,3]. Other work has shown
that preference elicitation for such decisions is dicult [28]. A variety of work on
autonomous agents suggests that even though they do not share people's cogni-
tive limitations and may have sucient computational capabilities to determine
theoretically optimal strategies, they also make suboptimal decisions simplicter,
whether as a matter of game theoretic issues [12] or systems design uninformed
by theory [69] or both. The increasing presence of agents operating as proxies
for people, not only for decisions simpliciter (e.g., bidding on eBay), but also for
sequential decision making situations (e.g., algorithmic trading) makes the de-
sign of eective agent strategies for sequentially dependent decisions an important
multi-agent systems challenge.
Interestingly, although people do not always maximize utility in individual
decisions, a range of work has shown that they are expected monetary value
(EMV) maximizers, in situations of repeated decisions simpliciter [88,43,5,42,49,
66,89,19,57,46], suggesting a preference for EMV maximization and the use of the
EMV-maximizing strategy when the decision making environment enables them
to recognize this solution. As sequentially dependent decisions involve a sequence
of decisions, these results provide a basis for presuming they maximize EMV for
such decisions as well. Research on people's strategies for sequentially dependentProblem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 3
decisions shows, however, that their strategies do not align with EMV maximizing
ones either for individual or for repeated sequentially dependent decisions [50].
This literature argues that the EMV strategy is complex and unintuitive, claiming
that people's deviation from the EMV model's predictions results from an inabil-
ity to compute the solution rather than from the model inadequately representing
the decision problem or their preferences [22]. As a result, we take the evidence
from repeated decisions simpliciter as a basis for using EMV-maximization as the
standard of optimality.
This paper focuses on repeated sequentially dependent decisions for three rea-
sons. First, computer agents are typically constructed for situations that re-occur,
that is, for repeated rather than for single use. Second, many decisions involving
uncertain outcomes are made repeatedly. Examples of such repeated sequentially
dependent decisions include both internet applications such as gambling in vir-
tual casinos, shopping for holiday gifts, searching for research papers on a spe-
cic topic, and \physical" applications such as chess tournaments [55], driving
(e.g., the repeated selection among routes) [5] as well as testing and repair of
complex automated systems [45]. Third, as discussed above, the assumption of
EMV-maximization as the standard measure of optimality is better justied for
repeated decision making than for one-shot decisions. We note, importantly, that
the approach and the methods we have developed may be used in non-recurring
decision situations since they do not depend on the recurrence (or obviously on
EMV). To measure their eectiveness in such situations, would, however, require
some measure of optimality or utility elicitation.
The paper describes novel methods for improving agent performance on se-
quentially dependent decisions and empirically evaluates their eect on agent
decision making and their usefulness for guiding people in making decisions in
sequentially dependent decisionsettings. The prototypical context of use of these
methods are website platforms for electronic marketplaces, such as alibaba.com,
made-in-china.com and gobizkorea.com that connect buyers with numerous dif-
ferent sellers. The sellers and their products are listed, but typically with only
very partial price information (e.g., a wide range of prices). To obtain actual
prices, buyers must query sellers directly, which they typically do through links
on the website. For some websites (e.g., autotrader.com and Yet2.com), buyers
must query sellers for supplementary information about opportunities (e.g., about
the used cars on Autotrader or inventions and patents Yet2).
1 These electronic
marketplaces compete, and to attract customers to their site, they aim to incor-
porate features that improve customers experience. The restructuring methods we
investigate are designed to provide such a capability. Thus, the improved agent
performance is intended to arise not by changing the agent design (which is prob-
lematic in these settings for reasons we discuss below), but rather by providing
an environment in which a variety of agent strategies embodied in autonomous
agents coming to such sites will perform better.
The paper explores the hypothesis that restructuring of the options presented
for sequentially dependent decisions would enable better performance by com-
puter agents. The goal of restructuring is to lead a decision maker to a sequence
1 The Yet2 marketplace operates as an online platform that allows \sellers" (industrial
rms, entrepreneurial ventures, research universities and individual inventors) to post their
inventions, while \buyers" can search the listed inventions [23].4 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
of choices that more closely align with the optimal strategy. This approach paral-
lels recent developments in psychology and behavioral economics [85,3,76,11,86]
that restructure a decision problem rather than attempting to change a person's
decision making strategy directly. For instance, this work has proposed removing
options to allow people to focus on an appropriate set of choices and characteristics
of those choices, which would suggest, for instance, that a used car buyer is likely
reach a better decision more quickly if presented with a smaller set of possible cars
and only the most important characteristics of those cars.
We take a restructuring approach rather than attempt to nd a way to get
agents to use the optimal strategy for two reasons. First, many multi-agent set-
tings, including the eCommerce examples we use in our test set, involve agents
designed by, and working for, a variety of organizations. The strategies these agents
used are pre-set and cannot be changed by an external system. The second reason
is rooted in the complexity of sequentially dependent decisions for which the set
of preferences are complex (as described in Section 3) and the optimal strategy is
non-intuitive. In such situations, explaining the optimal strategy requires substan-
tial eort and it may not be possible to persuade non-experts in decision making
or its correctness and optimality.
The restructuring we investigate includes elimination of a subset of the alter-
natives presented to the agent and changing the values of some characteristics of
an alternative. In particular, we adjust certain characteristics of each option to
compensate for possible reasoning biases. As we describe later, restructuring for
sequentially dependent decisions has several complexities not present in decisions
simpliciter. In particular, whereas for decisions simpliciter, a choice may be re-
moved simply on the basis of its own value, that is not possible for sequentially
dependent decisions. Future uncertainties may turn a presently unappealing choice
into a more appealing one. For instance, an investor might invest in stocks or in
bonds. If the stock market is bullish, then eliminating the bonds option would
force him to invest in stocks. If a few days later the stock markets collapses, the
elimination of bonds option may become detrimental.
We tested the restructuring approach to sequentially dependent decisions on
economic search problems [4,32,33,58,73,90]
2, which are search problems involv-
ing both uncertainty and costs of information gain. Economic search models rep-
resent well a variety of activities, including many in which agents are likely to
participate and which have a recurring nature (e.g., a consumer searching for a
product, a saver searching for an investment). In economic search, an agent needs
to choose among several opportunities, each of which has an associated distribu-
tion of gains; to obtain the actual gain out of this distribution, the agent incurs a
cost. In such problems, agents need to take into consideration the trade-o between
the cost of further exploration and the additional benet of knowing more values
[4,16,41]. Unlike typical AI problems of exploration|exploitation tradeos (e.g.,
multi-armed bandit problems), in economic search, the exploration yields a specic
value (rather than simply narrowing the distribution) and the end goal is choice
of an opportunity (rather than of an entity with which to continue interacting). It
is also distinguishable in having a closed-form solution.
The EMV-maximizing strategy for economic search problems has many in-
herent counter-intuitive characteristics [90] that make explaining it conceptually
2 These problems are known in other literatures as directed search with full recall [90].Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 5
challenging. Prior research has shown that people's strategy for economic search
problems does not align with the EMV-maximizing search strategy [73,58,32,10].
Thus, these problems provide a good test environment for the restructuring ap-
proach to sequentially dependent decisions.
The paper presents four problem restructuring heuristics for recurring sequen-
tially dependent decision problems, three xed and one adaptive. Each xed heuris-
tic manipulates the opportunities presented to an agent, either modifying the set
of possibilities presented to the agent or modifying the distribution of gains for
opportunities. The \information hiding", heuristic eliminates alternatives based
on the likelihood that they will not actually be needed by the theoretical-optimal
strategy. The \mean manipulation" heuristic restructures the distribution of gains
associated with each alternative in a way that leads an agent that is inuenced only
by means (rather than the distribution of gains) to follow (more closely) the op-
timal strategy. The \random manipulation" eliminates all the alternatives except
one; it turns the sequentially dependent decision into a degenerate decision sim-
pliciter (a consequence of removing all but one alternative), thus forcing choosing
the EMV maximizing alternative from the set of opportunities viewed as a decision
simpliciter options. The adaptive heuristic, denoted \adaptive learner", requires
repeated sequentially dependent decision interactions with the same agent. It uses
the results of the prior interaction history to model the decision-maker's strategy
and classify it according to a set of pre-dened strategies. It then applies the xed
restructuring heuristic that best matches the agent's classication.
The results of our experiments on economic search problems show that the
use of restructuring results in a sequence of choices that more closely resemble,
and are better aligned with, those produced by the theoretical-optimal ones for
the corresponding non-revised settings. For most agents, restructuring substan-
tially improves the expected outcome. The heuristics vary, however, in the extent
to which they improve the performance of dierent types of agents (in terms of
EMV). With the \mean manipulation" heuristic, some agents attained the maxi-
mum possible improvement, whereas the performance of others declined substan-
tially. Not surprisingly, this variation depended on the extent to which the agents'
strategies were mean-dependent. The \information hiding" heuristic, in contrast,
never yielded the maximum possible improvement for any agent, but the aver-
age improvement it produced was greater than for mean manipulation, and the
maximum degradation it engendered was substantially smaller. The \random ma-
nipulation" heuristic improved the performance of some agents, but substantially
worsened the performance of others. The \adaptive learner" heuristic produced
the best results. Both the frequency of detrimental eect and its magnitude was
substantially minimized when the system was able to classify an agent according
to strategy and use this classication in choosing among heuristics. To deter-
mine whether these heuristics although designed for agents would also be helpful
to people in sequentially dependent decision situations, we also ran experiments
with human subjects, using the information hiding and adaptive heuristics. Both
heuristics substantially improved people's performance. In this case, though, the
information hiding heuristic outperformed the adaptive heuristic. This result sug-
gests that either people are insuciently consistent in their decision making to
enable an eective classication of the strategies they use or that the strategies
they use are very dierent from those with which they equip their agents.6 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
This paper makes two signicant contributions. First, it demonstrates the ef-
fectiveness of problem restructuring for recurring sequentially dependent decisions.
Second, it denes heuristics for problem restructuring and demonstrates their use-
fulness for the economic search domain, as a proof of concept for the ability to
apply problem restructuring processes that perform eectively in general and for
specic individuals.
In the next section, we motivate the use of expected-value as a measure for
assessing the performance on recurring sequentially dependent decision problems.
Section 3 presents formally the economic search problem, its optimal (EMV-based)
solution and the complexities associated with recognizing the optimality of this
strategy. The four heuristics along with the motivation for using each one are
described in Section 4, and the details of the principles used to evaluate them are
given in Section 5. Section 6 provides an extensive analysis of the agents' strategies,
and Section 7 summarizes the results. Section 8 surveys relevant literature from
several elds. Finally, we provide our conclusions and directions for future research
in Section 9.
2 Performance Metrics for Sequentially Dependent Searching
An agent's performance on a sequentially dependent decision problem cannot be
measured solely by how close the nal choice comes to matching a simple prefer-
ence function, but must take into account the inherent uncertainty about outcomes
throughout the sequence of choices. This section briey reviews the use of expected
utility for assessing decisions simpliciter and challenges to it as an appropriate
metric for human decision-making, discusses dierences between people's decision
making strategies in repeated play (i.e., when they make the same decision repeat-
edly over many opportunities) from decisions simpliciter, and then argues for EMV
maximization as an appropriate measure of optimality for recurring sequentially
dependent decisions.
Utility theory, and in particular expected utility maximization, provides an
elegant model of decision making under uncertainty, with many variants proposed
as limitations have been revealed [72,65,24,18,56,59]. Its appropriateness as model
of people's decision-making behavior has, however, been challenged since the 1950s
[75,78] with systematic violations of the model being shown for such problems as
the Allais paradox [1] and Samuelson's colleague example [70].
Research in psychology and behavioral economics has identied various cog-
nitive explanations of the dierences between people's behavior and the \best
decisions" according to utility theory, with the argument that people are \satis-
cers" rather than \optimizers" [78] being perhaps the best well known among AI
researchers. More recent work includes evidence people prefer decision strategies
that favor winning most of the time [34]. Others have considered models where
agents maximize an individual utility which partially depends on the welfare of
other agents [35]. Currently, the main alternative to expected-utility maximization
as descriptive theories of choice under uncertainty are theories that incorporate
decision weights that reect the impact of events on the overall attractiveness of
uncertain choices (e.g., see [82] for a survey on non-expected utility descriptive
theories of choice under uncertainty). Among these decision-weighting theories are
sign-dependent theories, including prospect theory [37], and rank-dependent theo-Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 7
ries [63], with the main features of both incorporated later in cumulative prospect
theory (CPT) [87]. Recent experimental studies have demonstrated that cumu-
lative prospect theory more accurately matches/predicts people's behavior than
expected utility maximization [83,54]. A variety of new models that more closely
match people's decision simpliciter have been proposed [6,67,68].
Research on repeated decisions simpliciter, however, shows that people's de-
cision making alters when they are asked to choose repeatedly rather than just
once. Expected monetary value, a specialization of the expected-utility model in
which utilities are linear in outcomes [72], measures the average amount that a
strategy would yield if repeated many times. It has been shown that in repeated-
play settings people's strategies asymptotically approach the EMV strategy as the
number of repeated plays increases [88,46].
3 In particular, the probability a person
will prefer the option associated with the highest expected value is substantially
greater than in single-play settings [57]. Furthermore, repeated-play reduces such
disparities between people's choices and utility-maximizing model predictions as
possibility and certainty eects [43,89] and ambiguity aversion [55]. The tendency
of people to use expected-value considerations in repeated-play has been explained
as an \aggregation of risk" phenomenon [36], meaning that when decision makers
consider investment opportunities as part of a collection of gambles they will be
less risk averse, though without violating their own risk preferences.
Interestingly, the strategies peoples use in making repeated sequentially depen-
dent decisions do not align with the EMV maximizing strategy. Explanations in
the literature for this deviation dier from those for the analogous dierences for
individual decisions simpliciter. For decisions simpliciter, the deviation has been
attributed to non-EMV related preference or choice models. In the case of SDDs,
however, prior work attributes peoples failure to use an EMV-maximizing strat-
egy to the complexity and unintuitive nature of this strategy. For example, Dudey
and Todd [22] investigated peoples strategies for classical optimal online stopping
problems like the secretary problem [25]. They argue that although applying the
EMV-maximizing strategy is simple, its structure is not immediately obvious and
its derivation is not simple. They argue further that it is unlikely people will derive
and use the optimal rule for this type of search problem. Lee [50] suggested that
the optimal decision rule for stopping problems is beyond peoples cognitive capa-
bilities and thus requires people to employ heuristic solutions. We thus take the
evidence from repeated decisions simpliciter as a basis for assuming that people
are EMV-maximization seeking for SDDs and use this strategy as the measure of
optimality in analyzing our experimental results.
3 Modeling Choice as Structured Exploration
As the underlying framework for this research, we consider the canonical sequen-
tial economic search problem described by Weitzman [90] to which a broad class
3 For example, it has been shown that people's behavior tends to converge towards expected
value maximization when repeatedly facing Allais type binary choice problems [43,5]. This
phenomena is also reected in Samuelson's Colleague's decision to accept a series of 100 gam-
bles versus his refusal to accept only one [70]. Much evidence has been given to a general
phenomenon according to which most human participants accept risky gambles with positive
expected values when the gambles will be played more than once but reject the corresponding
single gamble [42,66,89,19].8 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
of costly exploration problems can be mapped. In this problem, a searcher is given
a number of possible available opportunities B = fB1;:::;Bng (e.g., each opportu-
nity represents a dierent store selling a product the searcher is interested in) from
which she can exploit only one. The value vi to the searcher of each opportunity
Bi (e.g., the price in the store, and more generally: expense, reward, utility) is un-
known. Only its probability distribution function, denoted fi(v), is known to the
searcher. For exposition purposes we assume values represent rewards and towards
the end of the section discuss the straightforward transition to the case where val-
ues represent an expense. The true value vi of opportunity Bi can be obtained but
only by paying a fee (e.g., the expense of driving to the store), denoted ci, which
might be dierent for each opportunity. Once the searcher decides to terminate her
search (or once she has uncovered the value of all opportunities) she chooses the
opportunity with the maximum value from the opportunities whose values were
obtained. A strategy s is thus a mapping of a world state W = (q;B
0  B) to an
opportunity Bi 2 B
0, the value of which should be obtained next, where q is the
best (i.e., maximum) value obtained by the searcher so far and B
0 is the set of
opportunities with values still unknown. (Bi = ; if the search is to be terminated
at this point.) The expected-benet-maximizing sequential search strategy s
 is
the one that maximizes the expected value of the opportunity chosen when the
process terminates minus the expected sum of the costs incurred in the search.
The search problem as formulated herein applies to a variety of real-world
search situations. For example, consider the case of looking for a used car. Ads
posted by prospective sellers may reveal little and leave the buyer with only a
general sense of the true value and qualities of the car. The actual value of the car
may be obtained only through a test drive or an inspection, but these incur a cost
(possibly varying according to the car model, location, and so forth). The goal of
the searcher is not necessarily to end up with the most highly valued car, since
nding that one car may incur substantial overall cost (e.g., inspecting all cars).
Instead, most car buyers will consider the tradeo between the costs associated
with further search and the marginal benet of a better-valued opportunity. Table
1 provides mappings of other common search applications to the model. In this
paper we consider costly search problems of recurring nature. Applications of this
type are many and indeed a large portion of our daily routine may be seen as
executing costly search processes: searching our closet for an outt for the day,
opening the refrigerator and choosing what to cook, searching for a parking space,
etc. In all these examples the search itself takes time and may consume resources,
resulting in a tradeo between the benet from the potential improvement in
the quality of the results we may further obtain and the costs of the additional
exploration.
The sequential economic search problem has a relatively simple expected-
benet-maximizing solution. Nevertheless, despite its simplicity the solution is
non-intuitive. A simplied version of an example from Weitzman [90] may be used
to illustrate its non-intuitive nature. This problem involves a research department
that has been assigned the task of evaluating two alternative technologies to pro-
duce a commodity. The benets of each are uncertain and can only be known if a
preliminary analysis is conducted. Since both technologies are used to produce the
same commodity, eventually no more than one technology would actually be used.
Table 2 summarizes the relevant information for decision-making. Technology ,
if eventually used, will yield a total benet of 100 with a probability of 0.5 andProblem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 9
Application Goal Oppor-
tunity
Value Search cost Source of uncer-
tainty
Parking Minimize
time to
park and
walk to
destina-
tion
Street
to park
in
Distance
from desti-
nation
Time spent; fuel
consumed
Uncertainty re-
garding the avail-
ability of parking
in the street and
exact distance of
parking within
street (if available)
Hitchhiking Minimize
time to
get to
destina-
tion
dierent
cars of-
fering
rides
time it takes
to get to
destination
(based on
the car's
planned
route)
Time it takes
till the next car
shows up
Uncertainty re-
garding destina-
tions of approach-
ing cars
Product
purchase
Minimize
overall
expense
Store Product
price
Time spent;
communication
and transporta-
tion expenses
Uncertainty re-
garding the sale
price in each store
Table 1 The mapping of real-life applications to the sequential search problem.
Technology  !
Cost 15 20
Reward (0.5,100) , (0.5,55) (0.2,240) , (0.8,0)
Table 2 Information for a simplied example.
a benet of 55 with a probability of 0.5, whereas the alternative technology !, if
used, will deliver a benet of 240 with a probability of 0.2 and with a probability
of 0.8 will not yield any benet. Research and development, which is mandatory
for eliminating uncertainty, costs 15 for the  technology and 20 for !.
The problem is to nd a sequential search strategy which maximizes the ex-
pected overall benet. Carrying out the required research and development only
for  or only for ! is essentially better than not researching either technology. The
expected value of researching  is  15+[0:5(100)+0:5(55)] = 62:5, whereas for !
it is  20+[0:2(240)+0:8(0)] = 28. Thus, at least one technology should be further
explored. The next logical question is which technology should be researched rst?
When reasoning about which alternative to explore rst, one may notice that by
any of the standard economic criteria,  dominates !: technology  has a lower
development cost, a higher expected reward, a greater minimum reward and less
variance. Consequently, most people would guess that  should be researched rst
[90]. However, it turns out that the optimal sequential strategy is to develop !
rst and if its payo turns out to be zero then develop .
Figure 1 depicts the appropriate decision tree for the problem above. Suppose
 is developed rst. If the payo turns out to be 55, it would then be worthwhile
to develop !, since the expected value of that strategy would be  20+[0:2(240)+
0:8(55)] = 72, which is greater than the value of not developing ! at that point,
i.e., 55. Even if  had a payo of 100, then developing ! would be favorable,
since the expected benet would be  20 + [0:2(240) + 0:8(100)] = 108. Therefore
the expected value of an optimal policy after rst developing  would be  15 +
[0:5(72) + 0:5(108)] = 75. A similar calculation for an optimal policy after rst10 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
Fig. 1 Solution to a simplied example.
developing ! would be  20 + [0:2(240) + 0:8( 15 + [0:5(100) + 0:5(55)])] = 78.
Thus, the optimal policy for this example has a counter-intuitive property whereby
! should be developed rst.
Solving the sequential economic search problem using a decision tree requires
considering all possible combinations of the opportunities whose value has not
been obtained yet, the best value obtained so far and the opportunity which value
needs to be reviewed next. Fortunately, it turns out that there is a simple way
to extract the optimal solution for the sequential search problem. The solution is
based on setting a reservation value (a threshold) denoted ri for each opportunity
Bi. The reservation value to be used should satisfy (see proof in [90]):
4
ci =
Z 1
x=ri
(x   ri)fi(x)dx: (1)
Intuitively, ri is the value where the searcher is precisely indierent: the expected
marginal benet from obtaining the value of the opportunity exactly equals the
cost of obtaining that additional value. The searcher should always choose to
obtain the value of the opportunity associated with the highest reservation value
and terminate the search once there is no remaining opportunity associated with
a reservation value greater than the highest value obtained so far (or all values
have already been obtained).
Consider the example in Table 2. The reservation values of the two technologies
can be extracted from (due to the discrete nature of the values): c =
P
xr(x 
r)P(x), resulting in r = 70, for , and c! =
P
xr!(x   r!)P(x), resulting in
r! = 140, for !. Therefore ! should be developed rst and if its real value is below
70 (i.e., if zero) then  should be developed next.
One important and non-intuitive property of the above solution is that the
reservation value calculated for an opportunity does not depend on the number
and properties of the other opportunities, but rather on the distribution of the
value of the specic opportunity and the cost of obtaining it. Another interesting
characteristic of the optimal solution is the fact that it often favors risky opportu-
nities (with low costs of obtaining their values) [90]. The explanation for this is that
the great improvement in the opportunity value that can potentially be achieved
4 The proof of optimality given in [90] holds also for the case where values are dened
based on a discrete probability function Pi(x), as in the example given above. In this case, the
calculation of the reservation value ri is given by ci =
P
xri(x   ri)Pi(x).Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 11
outweighs the cost incurred, despite the relatively low probability of achieving its
most benecial values. These opportunities tend to have higher reservation values
and hence need to be explored relatively early according to the optimal strategy.
Economic search problems have the exact characteristics of the type of prob-
lems we are interested in as described in the introduction: They are sequential in
nature and the ndings resulting from current decisions aect the choice of termi-
nating the process or which opportunity to check in the future. They are widely
applicable and people are likely to experience them in various forms on a daily
basis. Furthermore, their solution has many non-intuitive properties. Nevertheless,
as evidenced in the results section (and in prior literature [14,69]), both people
and the agents they program fail to follow the optimal strategy when engaged in
sequential economic search. Supplying the theoretic-optimal solution for the eco-
nomic search to the searcher is not always feasible. As discussed in former sections,
agents are typically programmed with a pre-set strategy. As for people, they are
likely not to trust the individual who gives them the optimal strategy (e.g., a pas-
senger is often reluctant to accept a route suggested by a taxi driver; a house seeker
often does not trust a real-estate broker's suggestions). It may require extensive
eort to convince the searcher of the optimality of the proposed solution. A pos-
sible way to persuade a searcher that a strategy for the economic search problem
is optimal is by giving her the optimality proof, but in our case that is relatively
complex and requires strong mathematical background.
5 Another possible way to
persuade an individual that a strategy is optimal is to calculate the expected value
of every possible sequence of decisions and compare it with the expected outcome
of the optimal strategy. However, in our case the number of possible sequences for
which the expected outcome needs to be calculated is theoretically innite in the
case of continuous value distributions or exponential (combinatorial) for discrete
probability distribution functions. A sequence denes the opportunity explored at
each stage given the set of values received for previously explored opportunities.
For N opportunities and V possible values upon which the distribution of values
is dened, there are O(N!)jV j
N such sequences. In this case the strategy cannot
even be expressed as its representation is exponential (unless we use the set of
reservation values to represent the strategy, which, again, needs to be initially ar-
gued). Thus, both these methods for proving optimality have substantial overhead
and require much eort in the case of economic search. In contrast, the problem
restructuring approach can improve performance without requiring such overhead.
The use of restructuring is completely transparent to the searcher, and does not
require any direct interaction with her.
Before continuing, we present the problem in its dual expected-expense-minimizing
version, on which our experimental design is based. In this case, opportunity val-
ues represent a payment, and the searcher attempts to minimize the expected
overall expense, dened as the expected value of the opportunity chosen when the
process terminates plus the expected sum of the costs incurred in the search. The
optimal strategy in this case is to set a reservation value ri for each opportunity
Bi, satisfying:
ci =
Z ri
x= 1
(ri   x)fi(x)dx (2)
5 The proof of optimality as given in [90] is four pages long and extensively uses mathematical
manipulations.12 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
The searcher should always choose to obtain the value of the opportunity asso-
ciated with the minimum reservation value and terminate the search once there
is no remaining opportunity associated with a reservation value lower than the
minimum value obtained so far (or all values have already been obtained).
4 Problem Restructuring Heuristics
In this section, we dene four problem-restructuring heuristics which we used in our
investigations: Information Hiding, Random Manipulation, Mean Manipulation
and Adaptive Learner. The rst three assume that no prior information about the
searcher is available and apply a xed set of restructuring rules (diering in the
information they present to the searcher). The fourth heuristic uses information
from a searcher's prior searches to classify her and decides which of the other three
heuristics to use. We emphasize that the need to initially supply the decision-maker
the full set of alternatives available to her precludes trivial solutions that force the
searcher to follow the optimal sequence.
6
For a restructuring heuristic to be considered successful, it needs not only to
improve the overall (cross-searchers) performance, but also to avoid signicantly
harming the individual performance of any searchers. It is notable that the removal
of an opportunity or its change is risky, because if the opportunity is needed even-
tually, its absence degrades performance. Similarly if the opportunity is required
in its original form, the searcher will fail to identify it as such. Still, as reected by
the results reported in the following sections, an intelligent use of the restructuring
heuristics manage to substantially improve overall performance with only very few
searchers suering a slight performance degradation individually.
4.1 The Information Hiding Heuristic
This heuristic removes from the search problem opportunities for which the prob-
ability that they will need to be explored according to the optimal strategy s

is less than a pre-set threshold . By removing these opportunities, we prevent
the searcher from exploring them early in the search, yielding a search strategy
that is better aligned with the optimal strategy in the early, and more inuen-
tial, stages of the search. While the removal of alternatives is likely to worsen the
performance of searchers that use the optimal strategy, the expected decrease in
performance is small; the use of the threshold guarantees that the probability that
these removed opportunities would actually be required if the optimal search were
to be conducted will remain relatively small. Formally, for each opportunity Bi
we calculate its reservation value, ri, according to Equation 2. The probability
of needing to explore opportunity Bi according to the optimal strategy, denoted
Pi, is the probability that all the opportunities explored prior to Bi (i.e., those
associated with a reservation value lower than ri) will yield values greater than
6 For example, at each stage of the search disclosing to the searcher the opportunity that
needs to be explored next according to optimal search strategy and terminate the process (e.g.,
by disclosing an empty set) when the value obtained so far is below the lowest reservation value
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ri, thus it is given by Pi =
Q
rjri P(vj  ri). The heuristic therefore omits every
opportunity Bi (i  n) for which Pi   from the problem instance.
4.2 The Mean Manipulation Heuristic
This heuristic attempts to overcome people's tendency to overemphasize mean val-
ues, reasoning about this one feature of a distribution rather than the distribution
itself more fully [58]. When relying on mean values, searchers typically choose to
explore the opportunity in which the expected net value is minimal (and lower
than the best (i.e., lowest) value obtained so far). We denote this search strategy
the \naive mean-based greedy search". Formally, denoting the mean of opportu-
nity Bi by i, searchers using the naive mean-based greedy strategy calculate the
value wj = j + cj for each opportunity Bj 2 B and choose to explore the value
of opportunity Bi = argminBjfwjjBj 2 B
0 \ wj  vg where v is the lowest value
obtained so far (and terminate the exploration when Bi = ;).
The heuristic restructures the problem in a way that the value wi, which a
searcher using the naive mean-based greedy search will assign each opportunity
Bi in the restructured problem, will be equal to the reservation value ri calculated
for that opportunity in the original problem. This ensures that the choices made
by searchers that use the naive mean-based greedy search strategy for the restruc-
tured problem are fully aligned with those of the optimal strategy for the original
problem. The restructuring is based on assigning a revised probability distribution
function f
0
i to each opportunity Bi (0 < i  n), such that w
0
i = ri, where ri is
the reservation value calculated according to Equation 2. The restructuring of fi
is simple, as it only requires the allocation of a large mass of probability around

0
i (the desired mean which satises w
0
i = ri). The remaining probability can be
distributed along the interval such that 
0
i does not change.
4.3 The Random Heuristic
This heuristic is ideal for searchers who do not really see any benet in exploring.
These searchers choose one opportunity and terminate the search immediately
thereafter. The opportunity picked can be the rst, the last or any other in the set
(including a random selection) or the one that complies with pre-dened criteria,
e.g., the one with the lowest net expectancy (value plus exploration cost). This
has evidence in experimental economics where it has been shown that some people
stop after one observation. For example, some automobile shoppers are reported
to check (and buy from) one dealer only [44] and some proportion of consumers
buy from the rst store they visit [20]. In such cases, where the searcher does not
see any benet in exploring, the ability to improve performance through problem
restructuring is limited since the heuristic can merely leave only the choice asso-
ciated with the lowest net expectancy (Bi = argminBjfj + cjjBj 2 B
0g) in the
set of choices (opportunities), and remove the remaining ones.14 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
4.4 The Adaptive Learner Heuristic
The adaptive learner heuristic attempts to classify the strategy of a searcher and
uses this classication to determine the best problem restructuring method to
apply from a pre-dened set. We use \class-representing agents" for classication
purposes. Each class-representing agent employs a strategy that best represents
strategies of a specic class. The class-representing agent can thus be used with any
problem instance, returning as an output the sequence used and the accumulated
cost it obtained. For some cases, the class-representing agent may have several
typical behaviors and thus will return a vector of possible outputs. For example in
the class of searchers that make a single selection only, the selection of any single
opportunity equally represents the class. In this case n results will be received
as output, each correlated with picking another opportunity. A searcher will be
classied as belonging to a class based on the similarity between her search and the
search exhibited by the class representing agent for the same problem instances
(in a \nearest neighbor"-like classication). The measure of similarity we use is
the achieved performance over the same set of problems. Specically, the searcher
is classied as belonging to the class for which the relative dierence between
the searcher's performance and its representing-agent's performance is minimal,
and below a threshold . Otherwise, if the minimal relative dierence is above
the threshold, the searcher is classied as belonging to a default class. Once the
searcher is classied, the restructuring heuristic that is most suitable for that class
can be applied. The use of the threshold  assures that for any searcher that
cannot be accurately classied, a default restructuring heuristic is used, one that
guarantees that the possible degradation in the performance of the searcher is
minor.
Algorithm 1 Classier for Adaptive Learner
Input: O - Set of prior problem instances and the searcher's performance in each instance.
S - Set of class representing agents.
Threshold - classication threshold.
Output: s - the classication of the searcher (null represents no classication or no previous
data).
1: Initialization: ds   0 8s 2 S
2: for every s 2 S do
3: for every o 2 O do
4: ds   ds + mini

jPerformancesearcher(o) Performances(o)[i]j
Performances(o)[i]

5: end for
6: end for
7: if min

ds
jOjjs 2 S

 Threshold then
8: return argmins(ds)
9: else
10: return null
11: end if
Our adaptive learner heuristic's classier is given in pseudo-code in Algorithm
1. It receives a set of prior problem instances, O, which also contains the searcher's
performance (i.e., its overall cost) in each instance and a set S of strategy classes
as input. The function Performances(o) returns a vector in which each element
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problem instance o.
7 The function Performancesearcher(o) is the performance
of the searcher being classied when encountered problem o (this value is part
of the input in O). For each strategy class s the classier calculates the relative
dierence between the performance of the representative agent of that class and
the performance of the searcher that needs to be classied (Step 4). In case the
representing agent returns a vector, as discussed above, it uses the minimum dif-
ference between Performancesearcher(o) and any of the vector elements. This is
repeated for any instance o 2 O (Steps 3-5). The algorithm then returns (Step
8) the class to which the searcher belongs (or null, if none of the distance mea-
sures are below the threshold set). Based on the strategy returned we apply the
restructuring heuristic which is most suitable for this strategy type (or the default
restructuring if null is returned).
The results we report in this paper for the adaptive learner heuristic are based
on a set S of three strategy classes: optimal strategy, naive mean-based greedy
search strategy and random strategy. We use the optimal strategy to represent the
class of strategies that are better o without any problem restructuring. It is note-
worthy that despite having the optimal strategy as being this class representative,
none of the agents that were evaluated used this strategy, as reported in Section 6.
Nonetheless, when it comes to representing strategies that will suer from input
restructuring, the optimal strategy is a natural pick. For a searcher that cannot
be classied as belonging to one of these three strategies, we use the information
hiding restructuring heuristic. To produce the functionality Performances(o) re-
quired in Algorithm 1, we developed the following three class-representing agents:
{ Optimal Agent. This agent follows the theoretical-optimal search strategy de-
scribed in Section 3.
{ Mean-based Greedy Agent. This agent follows the naive mean-based greedy
search strategy described in 4.2.
{ Random Agent. This agent picks one opportunity and then terminates its
search as described in 4.3. Since there are numerous possible selection rules
for picking a single opportunity, this agent returns a vector of size joj where
the i-th element gives the performance of picking only the i-th opportunity.
The more observations of prior searcher behavior given to the classier the
better the classication it can produce, and consequently the better the searcher's
performance is likely to be after the appropriate restructuring is applied. Ob-
viously, an even greater improvement in performance could be obtained if the
searcher's decision-making logic were available (i.e., the agent's design and code in
the case of an agent searcher) rather than merely results of prior searches. In this
case, by having the agent execute the search using each of the restructuring heuris-
tics, the one with which the agent performs best would be immediately revealed.
Nevertheless, in most cases, having access to the agent's code is inapplicable. Con-
sequently, the most the heuristic can count on is the searcher's performance in
prior searches.
7 While most representing agents return a single performance output, some representing
agents (i.e., the agent representing the class of searchers that are satised with a single selection,
as described above) return a vector of possible outcomes.16 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
5 Empirical Investigation of Restructuring
In this section we describe the principles of the agent-based and human-based
methodology used for this research. We continue by presenting the two domains
used for the empirical investigation of our approach. We then describe the four
sets of problems and the measures that were used to evaluate the performance
of our heuristics. Finally we present a detailed description of the two populations
and the experiments used to assess the eectiveness of input restructuring in our
domains.
5.1 Agent-Based and Human-Based Methodology
We tested the eectiveness of the general approach and the specic restructuring
heuristics with both agents and people. The use of agents in this context oers
several important advantages. First, from an application perspective, the ability
to improve the performance of agents in search-related applications and tasks, es-
pecially in eCommerce, could signicantly aect future markets. The importance
and role of such agents have been growing rapidly. Many search tasks are delegated
to agents that are designed and controlled by their users (e.g., comparison shop-
ping bots). Many of these agents use non-optimal strategies. Once programmed,
their search strategy cannot be changed externally, but it can be inuenced by
restructuring of the search problem. Second, from a methodological perspective,
the use of agents enables the evaluation to be carried out over thousands of dier-
ent search problems, substantially improving the statistical quality of the result.
Third, the use of agents eliminates human computational and memory limitations
as possible causes of ineciency. The ineciency of the agents' search is fully at-
tributable to their designs, reecting agent designers' limited knowledge of how to
reason eectively in search-based environments rather than cognitive processing.
The experiments with people as decision-makers complement the experimen-
tation with agents in several respects. First, it can validate or invalidate the eec-
tiveness of dierent heuristics, which have been proven to be useful in extensive ex-
perimentation with agents, when applied to people. The level of similarity between
peoples' strategies and agents' strategies is not conclusive; some work suggests a
relatively strong correlation between the behaviors of the two [14], while in other
work the agents have been reported to act dierent than people to some extent
[26,69]. Second, it is notable that while agents can be programmed only by people
with programming skills, the experiments with people as decision makers enable
testing the approach with the general population. Finally, while agents tend to use
a consistent strategy, people often tend to alternate between dierent strategies
and rules of thumb [84,81]. This imposes great challenges on heuristics such as the
adaptive learner, and hence the evaluation with people is crucial.
5.2 Domains for Empirical Evaluation
To evaluate the four heuristics and our hypothesis that performance in search-
based domains can be improved by restructuring the search problem we used
two dierent domains. The rst, called the \repairman problem", is more naturalProblem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 17
Domain Opportunity Bi Value distribution
fi(x)
Search cost ci
Job assignment a server server's queue
length
time it takes to query
the server to learn
about its current queue
length
Repairman prob-
lem
repairman charge requested by
repairman
cost of querying the re-
pairman to learn about
the requested charge
Table 3 Mapping of the two domains used in the experiments to the sequential search prob-
lem.
for human decision-makers as it relates to a somewhat \daily" search task. The
second, called \job-assignment", was used for agents, as it is based on a computer
environment and seems more \natural" for agents that strategy developers develop.
Job-assignment is a classic server-assignment problem in a distributed setting
that can be mapped to the general search problem introduced in this paper. The
problem considers the assignment of a computational job for execution to a server
chosen from a set of N homogeneous servers. The servers dier in the length of
their job queue. Only the distribution of each server's queue length is known. To
learn the actual queue length of a server, it must be queried, which is a time
consuming task (server-dependent). The job can eventually be assigned only to
one of the servers queried (i.e., a server cannot be assigned unless it has rst been
queried). The goal is to nd a querying strategy that minimizes the overall time
until the execution of the job commences. The mapping of this problem to the
sequential search problem in its cost minimization variant is straightforward (see
Table 3). Each server represents an opportunity where its queue length is its true
value and the querying time is the cost of obtaining the value of that opportunity.
The \repairman problem" was used for experiments with human decision-
makers. In the \repairman problem" the searcher considers N repairmen who
oer a service the searcher needs. The charge (price) of each repairman is asso-
ciated with some distribution of values. In order to reveal a repairman's price,
the searcher must pay a query fee. This problem is a cost minimization problem,
as the searcher attempts to minimize her total expense, which is the sum of the
querying fees and the price paid.
5.3 Tested Sets
We used four dierent sets of problems to evaluate the restructuring heuristics. To
simplify the search problem representation, distributions in all sets were formed
as multi-rectangular distribution functions. In multi-rectangular distribution func-
tions, the interval is divided into n sub intervals f(x0;x1);(x1;x2);::;(xn 1;xn)g
and the probability distribution is given by f(x) =
pi
xi xi 1 for xi 1 < x < xi and
f(x) = 0 otherwise, (
P n
i=1Pi = 1). The optimal search strategy for the problem
with multi-rectangular distribution functions is given in the appendix. The benet
of using a multi-rectangular distribution function is its simplicity and modularity,
in the sense that any distribution function can be modeled through it with a small
number of rectangles. The rst set of problems consisted of 5000 problems, each
generated as follows:18 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
{ Number of opportunities - randomly picked from the range (2;20).
{ Search cost of each opportunity - randomly picked from the range (1;100).
{ Distribution function assigned to each opportunity - generated by randomly
setting an interval and probability for each rectangle and then normalizing all
rectangles so that the distribution is properly dened over the interval (0;1000).
{ Number of rectangles in a distribution - randomly picked from the range (3;8).
This set was used as the primary set for experiments with agents. The choice of
the specic ranges was made to enable a rich set of problem variants: the cost
of searching was between one to three orders of magnitudes smaller than the
maximum value of an opportunity, and the number of opportunities substantially
varied.
The second and the third sets of problems also contained 5000 problems and
were generated with dierent distributions of values and querying costs, as follows:
{ Set 2: \Increased Costs". This set diered from the rst set of problems in
the interval from which opportunities' search costs were drawn, which in this
case was (1;300), resulting in an increased ratio between the search cost and
possible values of dierent opportunities. This increase in search costs should
have made searchers more reluctant to resume their search at any point.
{ Set 3: \Increased Variance". This set diered from the rst set of problems
in the sense that the multi-rectangular distribution function in this case was
dened over the interval (1000;10000), resulting in a substantial increased vari-
ance in opportunity values. This change should have made searchers more eager
to resume their search at any point.
The fourth set contained 100 dierent problems that were used primarily for
the experiments with people as decision makers. The problems were generated
in a manner similar to the procedure described above with minor adjustments.
First, since it is dicult for people to handle a large number of opportunities,
the set contained a xed number of 8 opportunities (\repairmen"). Second, the
multi-rectangular distribution function (which was still dened over the interval
(0;1000)) now had only four rectangles. This is mainly because it is dicult for
people to digest a complex distribution with a large number of rectangles.
5.4 Performance Measures
Two complementary measures were used to evaluate the dierent heuristics: (1)
relative decrease in the overall costs; (2) relative reduction in search ineciency.
Formally, we use topt(o) to denote the expected overall cost of the optimal search
strategy for problem o 2 O and trst(o;s) and t:rst(o;s) to denote the total costs
of a searcher s 2 S with the restructured and non-restructured versions of problem
respectively (where O is the set of problem instances and S is the set of searchers
evaluated).
8 The rst measure, calculated as (t:rst(o;s)   trst(o;s))=t:rst, re-
lates directly to the cost saved, which depends on the problem instance o, since
t:rst(o;s) can vary substantially. The second measure, calculated as (t:rst(o;s) 
trst(o;s))=(t:rst(o;s)   topt(o)), takes into account that the overall search cost
8 The notation S is thus augmented to consider any set of searchers, rather than just the
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using either the restructured or original data is bounded by the performance of
the optimal agent. It thus highlights the eciency of the heuristic in improving
performance.
The above measures are applicable to a specic problem instance and specic
searcher (either agent or person). The aggregative equivalents of these measures
that apply to the general population are dened as:
social performance improvement=
P
s2S
P
o2O
t:rst(o;s)  
P
s2S
P
o2O
trst(o;s)
P
s2S
P
o2O
t:rst(o;s)
: (3)
social reduction in search ineciency=
P
s2S
P
o2O
t:rst(o;s)  
P
s2S
P
o2O
trst(o;s)
P
s2S
P
o2O
t:rst(o;s)   jSj
P
o2O
topt(o)
:
(4)
These two measures apply directly to the overall change in the performance of the
population as a whole (i.e., the social change). A negative value for either measure
represents an increase in the overall search cost (in the case of (3)) or in the search
ineciency (in the case of (4)).
Two additional measures were used for agents:
individual performance improvement=
P
o2O
(t:rst(o;s)   trst(o;s))
P
o2O
t:rst(o;s)
: (5)
individual reduction in search ineciency=
P
o2O
(t:rst(o;s)   trst(o;s))
P
o2O
t:rst(o;s)  
P
o2O
topt(o)
: (6)
The latter measures apply to the average individual agent improvement (cross-
problems). The reason for calculating these measures only for agents is two-fold:
rst, the human subjects were limited by the number of search problems in which
they could engage (e.g., due to the experiment's length and the need to stay focused
for relatively long time). Second, as we discuss later in further detail, human
subjects were used in \between-subjects" design, hence no individual person had
both t:rst and trst results. Based on (5) and (6) we can also dene the cross-agents
average individual improvement, calculated as:
average individual performance improvement=
1
jSj
X
s2S
P
o2O
(t:rst(o;s)   trst(o;s))
P
o2O
t:rst(o;s)
:
(7)
average reduction in individual search ineciency=
1
jSj
X
s2S
P
o2O
(t:rst(o;s)   trst(o;s))
P
o2O
t:rst(o;s)  
P
o2O
topt(o)
:
(8)20 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
For each evaluated heuristic the maximum decrease in individual average per-
formance was recorded. This is due to the fact that an important requirement for
a successful heuristic is that it does not substantially worsen any of the agents'
individual performance.
5.5 Evaluating the Usefulness of Heuristics for Agents
The evaluation used agents designed by computer science students in a core Oper-
ating Systems course. While this group does not represent people in general, it rea-
sonably represents future agent developers who are likely to design the search logic
for eCommerce and other computer-aided domains. As part of a regular course as-
signment, each student programmed an agent that received a list of servers with
their distribution of waiting times and their querying costs (times) as input. The
agents had to query the servers (using a proxy program) to learn their associated
waiting time and then choose one of these queried servers to execute a (dummy)
program. This search problem expanded an existing assignment that was focused
on probabilistic assignment, making it a more complete assignment. The students
were told that: (a) the agent would be run repeatedly with 5000 dierent problem
instances generated according to the guidelines described in 5.3; (b) the agent's
performance would be determined as its average expected-expense in all runs;
and (c) their grade for the strategy part of the assignment would be determined
based on their agents performance, linearly. As part of their assignment, students
provided documentation describing the algorithms they used to search for a server.
An external proxy program was used to facilitate communication with the dif-
ferent servers. The main functionality of the proxy was to randomly draw a server's
waiting time, based on its distribution, if queried, and to calculate the overall time
that had elapsed from the beginning of the search until the dummy program began
executing (i.e., after assigned to a server and waiting in that server's queue). Each
agent in our experiments was evaluated using all problems from all four sets.
5.6 Evaluating the Usefulness of Heuristics for People's Searches
The evaluation infrastructure for the experiments with people as decision makers
was developed as a JavaScript web-based application, emulating an exploration
problem with 8 repairmen, each associated with a dierent distribution of service
fees (repairman's charge) and a cost for obtaining the true price (represented as a
\query fee", for querying a repairman). Figure 2 (top panel) presents a screenshot
of the system's GUI. In this example, the fee distribution of six repairmen is rep-
resented by the bar-graphs and for the other two repairmen the actual fee is given
(i.e., already revealed). Querying a repairman is done by clicking the \Check" but-
ton below its distribution, in which case the true value of the repairman becomes
known and the query fee of that repairman is added to the accumulated cost.
The game terminates when clicking the \Buy" button, which is available only for
repairmen whose values have been revealed. After \buying" the subject is shown
a short summary of the overall expense, divided into the accumulated exploration
cost and the amount paid for the service itself (see buttom panel in Figure 2).Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 21
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2 Screenshots of the system designed for the experiments with people as decision-makers.22 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
The subjects were recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk service [2].
9
When logged in, the subjects received a short textual description of the exper-
iment, emphasizing the exploration aspects of the process, its recurring nature
and the way costs are accumulated. Next, they had to play a series of practice
games in order to make sure they understood the above. Participants had to play
at least three practice games; they could continue practicing until they felt ready
to start the experiment. After completing the practice stage participants had to
pass a qualication test, making sure they understand the recurring nature of the
game and that performance will be based on the average achieved. Then, partic-
ipants were told they were about to play the 20 \real" games. At this point the
system randomly drew 20 problems from its fourth problem set to be played se-
quentially. To prevent the carryover eect, a \between subjects" design was used,
i.e., the same restructuring was used in all of the 20 problems presented to a given
subject.
10 To motivate players to exhibit ecient exploration behavior, and possi-
bly also extend their practice session, they were told that they will receive a bonus
that linearly depends on their average expense over the 20 games. As a means
of precaution, the time it took each participant to make each selection and the
overall time of each game played was logged, and the results of participants with
unusual low times were removed from the analysis. Overall, 120 people partici-
pated in our experiments; 40 played in a non-restructured environment, 40 played
with the information-hiding restructuring heuristic and 40 played with the adap-
tive learner restructuring heuristic.
11 The reason the mean manipulation heuristic
was not included in the experiments with people is that people (unlike agents)
are likely to fail in calculating the mean values, thus this heuristic is likely to be
much less eective than others. As for the random manipulation, the performance
of this heuristic with people does not require designated experimentation, as the
performance trst(o;s) is subject-independent (since there is only one opportunity
presented to the searcher) and the performance t:rst(o;s) is recorded in any case
as part of the experimental design. We would like to emphasize that while not
tested \stand-alone", both the mean manipulation and the random manipulation
heuristics were implemented as part of the adaptive learner heuristic and used for
its evaluation with people.
6 Strategy Analysis
In this section we present and analyze the dierent strategies that were embedded
in the agents by the strategy designers. The analysis reveals great variance both in
the strategy structure and the parameters that the strategies used. In particular,
all of the strategies diered from the optimal strategy. The analysis of people's
strategies is beyond the scope of this paper for two main reasons. First, while asking
people to document or express their search strategy as part of the experiment is
possible, relying on these statements is very problematic. Evidence of discrepancies
9 For a comparison between AMT and other recruitment methods see [61].
10 Of course the between-subject design raises the question of wiping out the individual
heterogeneity in search behavior that can be quite large. Still, if we used a within-subject
design we would have been aected by learning.
11 Since each participant in AMT has a unique ID, connected to a unique bank account, it
is possible to block the same ID from participating more than once in a given experiment.Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 23
Agent ID mean variance median cost random subset
accumula‐
ted  cost
prob‐
ability
1‐6,17 v v
7,11,12, 14‐
16,18, 
19,24‐26, 
28,29,30
vv v
59‐61 v v
36‐38 v v
39‐58,62‐
63,65‐67
v
8,9,10 v v v
13,21,22 v v v
20,31 v v v v
23 v v v
27 v v v
68‐7 1 v vvv
32,33 v v
34,35 v v v
64 v
72 v v
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
%
 
a
g
e
n
t
s
Fig. 3 Strategy characteristics according to the manual classication (based on code and
documentation). The right graph depicts the percentage of agents that used in their strategy
each characteristic.
between actual and reported human behavior is a prevalent theme in research [30,
7,40]. Second, reverse engineering of the collected data into a strategy is infeasible
in our case due to the richness of the problems used and the limited number of
observations collected for each person, as well as the large amount of dierent
possible behaviors.
Overall, we had 72 agent strategies, each developed by a dierent person. The
strategies used for the agents reveal several characteristics along which agent de-
signs varied in our population of programmers. In this section, we use two tech-
niques to classify the agents' strategy-characteristics. The rst is based on manual
classication of agents according to search strategy characteristics reected in the
documentation that was supplied by the strategy designers; the second technique
is based on the agents' performance. The manual classication (based on docu-
mentation and code review) revealed substantial diversity in the agents' strategies
that is mostly captured by the following essential characteristics (see Figure 3 for
the level of use of each characteristic):
12
{ \mean", \variance", and \median" - correspond to taking into consideration
to some extent the expected value, the variance and the median value of each
server, respectively, in the agent's strategy.
{ \cost" - indicates taking into consideration the time (cost) of querying servers.
{ \random" - indicates the use of some kind of randomness in the decision making
process of the agent.
{ \subset" - indicates a preliminary selection of a subset of servers for querying.
{ \accumulated cost" - indicates the inclusion of the cost incurred so far (i.e.,
\sunk cost") in the decision making process.
{ \probability" - indicates the use of the probability of nding a server with a
lower waiting time than the minimum found so far in the agent's considerations.
Several interesting observations can be made based on the use of these charac-
teristics, as reected in Figure 3. First, many of the agents use the mean waiting
12 See Appendix for a detailed list of some of the more interesting strategies used.24 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
time of a server as a parameter that directly inuences their search strategy, even
though the optimal strategy is not directly aected by this parameter (cf. Section
3). This is also the case with the variance and median. In particular, the use of
randomization and the accumulated cost as a consideration has no correlation with
and plays no role in the optimal strategy. Finally, a substantial number of agents
(34 of the 72) do not take into account the cost of search in their strategy. One
possible explanation for this phenomena is that the designers of these strategies
considered cost to be of very little importance in comparison to the mean waiting
times.
We emphasize that the dominance of the mean-use characteristic in the agents'
strategies can be considered an evidence for the tendency of people towards EMV-
maximization. More than 55% of the agents' strategies took into consideration
mean calculations. In particular, 97% (corresponding to 31 of the 32 agents that
did not base their selection on querying a single server only) implemented some
level of mean computation and 16% (5 out of the 32) fully implemented the pure-
mean strategy.
The second classication method that was applied is based on the agents'
performance with the rst set of 5000 problems. Figure 4 depicts the average
performance of each agent with that set. The vertical axis represents the average
overall time until execution and the horizontal axis is the agent's number (for
clarity of presentation the agents are ordered according to their performance, thus
the IDs are not correlated with those given in Figure 3). The two horizontal lines
in the gure represent the performance of an agent searching according to the
optimal strategy and an agent that randomly queries and picks a single server.
As can be seen from the gure, none of the agents' strategies reached the level of
performance of the optimal strategy. The average overall time (cost) obtained by
the agents is 446:8, while that of the optimal agent is 223:1. Furthermore, many
of the strategies (40 of 72) did even worse than the \random" agent.
From Figure 4, it seems that other than the group (40 - 71) most of the agents
cannot be classied merely based on average performance. Therefore, an attempt
was made to identify clusters of agents, based both on agents' performance and
their design characteristics as given in Figure 3. The following clusters emerged
from this assessment:
{ The naive mean-based greedy search strategy and its variants (agents 3-7).
{ Mean-based approaches that involve preliminary ltering of servers according
to means and costs (agents 14-16).
{ A variation of the naive mean-based greedy search strategy that also takes the
variance of each server as a factor (agents 21-22).
{ Querying the two servers with the lowest expected queue length and assigning
the job to the one with the minimum value found (agents 24-26).
{ Assigning the job to the rst/last/a random server (agents 40-71).
For many agents, similarities in performance could not be explained by resem-
blances among the strategies themselves. In fact, the above classication covers
only 45 of the 72 agents. The remaining agents, even when associated with an
average performance close to the former agents', do not share any strategy char-
acteristic with them, giving evidence to large number of dierent strategies used.
Even in cases, where agents used dierent variants of the same basic strategy, the
dierences among the variants resulted in substantial performance dierences.Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 25
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Fig. 4 The individual average performance in the original (non-restructured) problems of the
rst set (to make the results easier to follow, agents' IDs represent the relative order according
to the individual performance).
We extended the performance-based classication by considering the agents'
rankings. Figure 5 compares the agents' performance time-wise and rank wise.
The time-wise measure represents an agent's average time (i.e., cost equivalent)
over the rst set of problems. The rank-wise measure represents an agent's av-
erage relative ranking (where 1 is the best rank). This measure was calculated
by extracting each agent's rank (based on its performance compared to the other
agents' performance) in each problem, and taking the average ranking of the agent
over the entire set. In general, as observed from the graph, the time-wise and the
rank-wise measures are correlated. Three areas of inconsistency between the two
can be observed in the gure (marked with circles). They relate to the agents as-
sociated with similar individual average performance, however with very dierent
average rankings (1A vs. 1B, 3A vs. 3B) and vice versa (2A vs. 2B). A drill-down
analysis based on the strategy documentation of the agents associated with these
inconsistencies reveals the reasons for these variations. The most interesting incon-
sistency is between clusters \1A" and \1B" which had relatively good performance.
All agents belonging to these two groups are mean-based; the dierence between
them is in their \stopping rule". The agents belonging to group \1A" terminate
their search if the queue length of the recently explored server is smaller than
the sum of any of the servers' queue length and its querying time. The \stopping
rule" of the agents belonging to group \1B", on the other hand, is to terminate the
search if the minimal queue length found so far is smaller than the sum of any
of the servers' queue length and its querying time. When the agents from group
\1A" are evaluated according to their average time their performance is close to
the performance of the naive mean-based agents, however the rank-based measure
reveals that they perform worse than the naive mean-based agents. The average-
time-based measure is unable to dierentiate between the two groups because the
dierence in their performance is not signicant. This is because the additional ex-
ploration by agents of group \1A" adds very little to the average (time-wise). The
changes, though small in absolute values, are consistent and thus aect ranking to
an extent that dierentiate this group from the naive mean-based agents.
The second major inconsistency is between agents of groups \2A" and \2B".
Based on the average ranking of these agents, one would expect that they would26 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
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Fig. 5 Individual average performance (primary vertical axis) versus individual average rank-
ing (secondary vertical axis).
have similar average performances. However, the performance measure reveals sub-
stantial dierences in performance. Common to all agents in those groups is the
search extent; in the worst case they all query three servers. The dierence is that
the agents from \2B" always query three servers whereas the agents from \2A"
rst check if the expectancy of the next server is lower than the minimal queue
length revealed so far. While the eect of this dierence on the agents' perfor-
mance is substantial, its eect on the ranking is negligible. This is because of the
frequency in which the two search sequences dier | the number of times that
agents from group \2A" end up querying less than three servers is moderate, hence
the eect on ranking is minor. However, the performance dierence in those cases
is substantial, resulting in a noticeable eect over the agents' average performance.
The last observable inconsistency relates to agents of groups \3A" and \3B".
Agents from group \3B" randomly choose a server and assign the job to it, whereas
the agents from group \3A" choose the server with the maximum query time (e.g.,
hoping that the more \expensive" will yield the best result) and assign it the job. In
this case, the dierence in performance is small but consistent, hence the dierence
in ranking is substantial.
7 Results
In this section we report the results of the dierent restructuring heuristics based
on experimenting with agents and with people.
7.1 Agents' Results
The following paragraphs detail the performance achieved by each heuristic, based
on the set of 72 agents. It is noteworthy, as reported in the former section, that
from the 72 agents, a signicant number (40) based their strategy on querying a
single server only. While this selection rule is legitimate, the fact that it is used
by a substantial number of agents may suggest a great inuence over the results.Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 27
Therefore, for each heuristic we also provide the average performance measures
when calculated for the subset of agents that use richer strategies, showing that
even for that subset alone the same results hold.
The results in this section are based on the rst set of 5000 search problems.
Later we show that these results carry over to the second and third sets (\Increased
variance" and \Increased search costs").
7.1.1 Information Hiding
The threshold  used for removing alternatives from the problem instance is a
key parameter aecting the \Information Hiding" heuristic. Figure 6 depicts the
average time until execution (over 72 agents, for the 5000 problem instances of the
rst problem set) for dierent threshold values. For comparison purposes, it also
shows the average performance on the non-restructured set of problems, which
corresponds to  = 0 (a separate horizontal line). The shape of the curve has
an intuitive explanation. For small threshold values, an increase in the threshold
increases agent performance as it further reduces the chance for a possible devi-
ation from the optimal sequence. Since the probability that the removed servers
are actually needed is very small, the negative eect of the removal of options is
negligible. However, as the threshold increases, the probability that an opportu-
nity that was removed is actually needed by the optimal strategy substantially
increases, and thus a greater performance decrease is experienced.
As can be observed from Figure 6, the optimal (average-time-minimizing)
threshold, based on the 5000 problem instances of the rst set, is  = 10%, for
which an average time of 407.5 is obtained. This graph also shows that for a large
interval of threshold values around this point | in particular for 3%    30%
| the performance level is relatively similar. Thus, the improvements obtained are
not extremely sensitive to the exact value of  used; relatively good performance
may be achieved even if the  value used is not exactly the one which yields the
minimum average time. In fact, any threshold below  = 62% results in improved
performance in comparison to the performance obtained without the use of this
restructuring heuristic (i.e., with  = 0). Figure 7 complements Figure 6 by de-
picting the average performance of the optimal search strategy when used with the
information hiding heuristic, with dierent values of . As discussed above, the use
of the information-hiding heuristic results in performance degradation whenever
an opportunity that was removed is actually required for the searcher according
to the optimal search sequence. The gure illustrates that, for low values of 
(up to  = 16%), the degradation in the optimal search strategy's performance is
relatively moderate. This result strengthens the applicability of the information-
hiding heuristic, as for the relevant -values, even if the searcher uses the optimal
search strategy, the performance degradation is mild.
We analyzed the opportunities that were removed when Information Hiding
was applied. The analysis revealed that those opportunities that were removed
were not necessarily the more certain ones nor the ones with the low expected
payo. In fact, the distribution of mean and variance of these opportunities is
very similar to the one characterizing all opportunities in general. Hence there is
no general rule of thumb for what opportunities will be removed most often solely
based on these two measures.28 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
Fig. 6 The eect of  on the average performance (cross-agents) in \information hiding".
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Fig. 7 The eect of  on the average performance of the optimal search strategy, when
information hiding is applied.
Figure 8 depicts the individual reduction in search ineciency (according to
Equation 6) of each agent with  = 10%. As shown, this heuristic managed to
decrease the search ineciency of 64 of the 72 agents. The average reduction in
individual search ineciency (according to (8)) is 15.5% and the average individ-
ual performance improvement (according to (7)) is 7.8%. The maximum individual
reduction in search ineciency that was obtained is 80.2%. Alongside the improve-
ment in the agents' performance, this heuristic also worsened the performance of
some of the agents. The maximum decrease in individual performance was found
for an agent whose search ineciency increased by 12.1%, which corresponds to a
2.2% degradation in its individual performance measure (according to (5)).
Similar results are obtained when agents that query and choose only a single
opportunity were excluded. In this case the average reduction in individual search
ineciency is 14.9% and the average individual performance improvement is 7.9%.
The maximum individual reduction in search ineciency is 80.2% as before.
The main advantages of the information hiding heuristic are therefore that it
improves the performance of most agents and that even in cases in which an in-
dividual agent's performance degrades, the degradation is relatively minor. Thus,
the heuristic is a good candidate for use as a default problem-restructuring heuris-
tic whenever there is no information about the searcher's strategy or an agent
cannot be classied accurately.Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 29
Fig. 8 Average reduction in the individual search ineciency of information hiding for  =
10% (agent's ID represents its order rather than the specic agent's identication).
Fig. 9 Average reduction in the individual search ineciency of Mean Manipulation (agent's
ID represents the order rather than the specic agent's identication).
7.1.2 Mean Manipulation
Figure 9 depicts the average reduction in search ineciency of each agent when
using the \Mean Manipulation" heuristic. With this heuristic, the search ine-
ciency of ve of the agents was eliminated almost entirely (the last ve agents to30 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
the right). These agents used variants of the naive mean-based greedy search strat-
egy. Other agents also beneted from this heuristic and substantially reduced the
overhead associated with their inecient search. These agents also use mean-based
considerations, to some extent, in their search strategy.
This heuristic has a signicant downside, though | 15 agents did worse with
the mean manipulation heuristic, 12 of them substantially worse. For these agents
the search ineciency increased by up to 250%. Overall, the average individual
search ineciency with the mean manipulation slightly increased (by 0.6% accord-
ing to (8)), while the average individual performance improvement (according to
(7)) was 1.5%. This example of an improvement by one measure which is reected
as a degradation according to another is a classic instance of Simpson's paradox
[80].
Similar results are obtained when excluding agents that query and choose only
a single opportunity. In this case the average individual search ineciency in-
creased by 5.8%, and the average individual performance degraded by 3.4%
The substantial increase in search overhead for some of the agents makes this
heuristic inappropriate for general use. It is, however, very useful when incor-
porated into an adaptive mechanism that attempts to identify agents that use
mean-based strategies and applies this restructuring method to their input (as in
the case of our adaptive learner heuristic).
7.1.3 Random Manipulation
Figure 10 depicts the average reduction in search ineciency of each agent when
using the \Random Manipulation" heuristic. This heuristic improved the perfor-
mance of 47 agents (a decrease in the individual ineciency of 50% for most of
them according to (6)). The remaining 25 agents (all of them from the group of the
32 agents that do not limit the evaluation to one opportunity only) did substan-
tially worse with this restructuring heuristic; for two of them the individual search
ineciency increased by more than 1000%. Overall, the average individual search
ineciency increased by 38.8% (according to (8)), and the average individual per-
formance was improved by 17.9% (according to (7)), which is again explained by
Simpson's paradox.
As expected, the results with this heuristic are substantially worse when ex-
cluding agents that query and choose only a single opportunity. In this case the
individual search ineciency increases in average by 150.6%, and the individual
performance degrades by 19.1%.
7.1.4 Adaptive Learner
The adaptive learner was found to be the most eective heuristic among the four.
Figure 11 depicts the average reduction in search ineciency for each agent when
using the adaptive learner heuristic (with a threshold of  = 7% and  = 10% for
information hiding). As observed in the gure, the improvement in most agents'
individual search ineciency is very close to the best result obtained with any of
the former three heuristics, indicating that the adaptive learner managed to suc-
cessfully assign each agent with the most suitable restructuring method. Overall,
the average reduction in individual search ineciency (according to (8)) is 43.7%.
The average individual performance improvemant (according to (7)) is 20.3%. TwoProblem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 31
Fig. 10 Average reduction in the individual search ineciency of Random Manipulation
(agent's ID represents the order rather than the specic agent's identication). For exposi-
tion purposes, the data is given as two graphs. The left graph contains the 12 agents whose
performance worsened by more than 100% and the right graph contains the remaining agents
(hence the dierent scale of the vertical axis).
Fig. 11 Average reduction in the individual search ineciency of Adaptive Learner (agent's
ID represents the order rather than the specic agent's identication).
of the 72 agents slightly worsened their performance (maximum of 10.2% increase
in search ineciency (according to (6)), which is equivalent to a decrease of 2.4%
in individual performance (according to (5))). Similar results are obtained when
excluding agents that query and choose only a single opportunity. In this case
the average reduction in individual search ineciency is 37.6% and the average
individual performance improvemant is 10%.
Figure 12 depicts the average accuracy of the adaptive learner in assigning
the 72 agents to their appropriate classes. The accuracy is taken to be a binary32 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
measure, receiving 1 if the agent is classied to the class in which the restructur-
ing method yields the best performance among the four restructuring heuristics
discussed in this paper and 0 otherwise. The gure presents the average accuracy
cross-agents, per round number (i.e., the value for round x reects the average
accuracy resulting from a classication that takes as an input a set of x-1 problem
instances). As observed from the gure, the adaptive learner achieves quite impres-
sive classication accuracy even with a moderate number of previously observed
problem instances. In fact, even with 10 records in its database, the adaptive
learner manages to achieve 86% classication accuracy. The fact that the perfor-
mance of the method remains steady around 92% as more observations accumulate
suggests that the agents are consistent and the strategies they use are adequately
identied based only on their results. The fact that the agents are consistent is
not surprising, since most agents did not use randomization in their strategy. Even
those agents that did use randomization in their strategy were mostly from the
\random" class and could be identied based on the fact that they explored only
a single opportunity. The fact that agents were adequately classied based on a
small subset of observations is of greater importance. It implies that the strategies
used by agents of dierent classes are substantially dierent, and the dierence is
reected to a great extent, according to the performance measure used, enabling
an accurate classication. The fact that the classication accuracy does not go be-
yond 92%, even with 5000 problem instances suggests that there is a small subset
of agents which cannot be correctly classied by the adaptive learner, regardless
of the extent of prior observations available.
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Fig. 12 Percentage of correct classication in 5000 problems (cross agents) performed by the
adaptive learner heuristic. The values on the horizontal axis represent the number of prior
problem instances available to the adaptive learner for the classication.
Figure 13 complements the analysis given based on Figure 12 by depicting the
number of changes made in the classication decision of the adaptive learner for
each agent. It is divided into three graphs, each referring to a dierent interval
of iterations of the 5000 rounds. The horizontal axis represents agent IDs and
the vertical axis is the number of changes made in that agent's classication in
the relevant interval (agent's ID represents order rather than a specic agent's
identication). The most interesting observation made based on Figure 13, is that
for most agents (39) there was no change in agent classication after determin-Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 33
ing its initial classication based on its result in a single problem instance. The
classication of 63 of the agents did not change after 100 observations . Accumu-
lating more observations change the classication of the remaining agents almost
insignicantly. Overall, the number of changes in the classication of agents of
that latter group is small and such changes are rare in the interval 100   5000.
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Fig. 13 The number of changes made by the adaptive learner in the classication decision
for each agent over three intervals: (0 - 10), (10 - 100) and (100 - 5000).
7.2 Evaluation with Dierent Problem Sets
Table 4 presents the results obtained for the second and the third problem sets
with the 72 agent searchers (as discussed in Section 5.3). As can be seen from the
table, the improvement obtained using the adaptive heuristic over the second and
the third sets of problems is consistent with the one obtained using the rst set.
Original Inc. Var Inc. Quer.
Non-Restructured 446.8 3895.3 559.6
Adaptive 344.3 3004.16 428.9
Optimal 223.1 1349.7 332.3
Average reduction in search ineciency 43.7% 25.7% 49.3%
Average individual performance improvement 20.3% 18.2% 19.7%
Maximum individual increase in search ineciency 10.2% 16.7% 26.6%
Maximum individual performance degradation 2.4% 0.5% 4.4%
Table 4 Performance for dierent classes of problems34 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
7.3 Results Obtained with Human Searchers
Since a \between subjects" design was used for the experiments with people as
decision makers, the methodology used for the analysis of the results in this section
is dierent from the one used for agents (as discussed in 5.6 in more detail). The
primary evaluation measures used for evaluating the restructuring heuristic in this
section is the social performance improvement (according to (3)) and the social
reduction in search ineciency (according to (4)), and the problems used for this
experiment are from the fourth set of problems. The average overall performance
of people (in terms of overall expense in the \repairman problem") without ap-
plying any restructuring technique was 369:2. When using the Information hiding
manipulation, the average was 287, and with the adaptive learner the average was
316:2. The average performance of the optimal strategy when used with this set is
230:8. These results reect a social reduction in search ineciency of 59.4% (ac-
cording to (4)), and 22.3% improvement in social performance (according to (3))
when the information-hiding heuristic is used. With the adaptive learner, a reduc-
tion in search ineciency (according to (4)) of 38.3% and a 14.4% improvement
in social performance (according to (3)) are obtained.
These results with people, while encouraging, do not correspond with the dom-
inance of the adaptive learner over the other approaches that was found with
agents. Figure 14 depicts the overall average social reduction in search ineciency
and the overall average social performance improvement of people and agents over
the fourth problem set with information-hiding and adaptive learner heuristics. For
computer agents the best is the adaptive learner. As this gure shows, the oppo-
site is true for people. This is reected in both measures and to a similar extent.
The dominance of the information-hiding over adaptive learner heuristic when
used with people may be explained by people's inconsistency in decision-making
(hence preventing the adaptive learner from eciently classifying people) or by a
dierence between the strategies used by people and those strategies upon which
the restructuring heuristics are based. Support for the rst possible explanation
can be found in Figure 15, depicting the percentage of people that the adaptive
learner assigned to a class other than the default one, in each of the 20 rounds.
As the gure shows, the classication to an actual (non-default) class converges
to 40% of the people. For the remaining 60%, the information-hiding heuristic
was used as a default. While the use of information-hiding with a large portion of
the population turned out to be benecial (based on the overall performance of
the method with people), the fact that the adaptive learner resulted in a worse
performance measure suggests that even those 40% that were classied according
to non-default classes were used with a restructuring heuristic that actually made
them perform substantially worse.
The main conclusion from the comparison of agents' and people's performance
with the dierent heuristics is that for situations where the searchers are people a
simple restructuring heuristic like the information hiding heuristic is more suitable
than a complex one, which attempts to classify the searcher's strategy online,
such as the adaptive technique. When facing a consistent searcher (i.e., agent),
on the other hand, an adaptive heuristic can substantially improve the searcher's
performance.Problem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 35
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Fig. 14 A comparison of the performance achieved with information-hiding and adaptive
learner heuristics when applied over people and agents: (a) social reduction in search ine-
ciency; and (b) social performance improvement.
Fig. 15 Percentage of people that the adaptive learner assigned to class other than the default
one, on each of the 20 rounds of the experiment.
8 Related Work
Research in psychology and behavioral economics has established that people are
bounded rational [79,64,38] and argued that their decision-making may be inu-
enced by such factors as the tendency to gather facts that support certain con-
clusions and disregard those that do not [9,21]. Other research attributes people's
diculty in decision-making to the conict between a \reective system" and an
\automatic system" [85,17]. As described in the body of this paper, other research
has investigated the usefulness of restructuring for decisions simpliciter [3,76,85,
11,86].
Research in economics on search theory has focused largely on theoretical as-
pects of the optimal search strategy, with a smaller body of work showing the
extent to which people's strategies diverge from the theoretical optimal one [33,
58]. The major nding of this work, which focuses on a \stopping rule" (which
assumes all opportunities share the same distributions of values, i.e., there is no
heterogeneity of distributions), is that people tend to terminate their search before
the theoretic-optimal strategy would [81,74].36 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
A number of approaches have been pursued to the design of decision-support
systems [62,92,8, interalia] which assist people in identifying, reasoning about, and
assessing a (more) full set of possible outcomes. Research in articial intelligence
has proposed a variety of approaches such as \persuasion" [31,60,39,27,48] and
negotiation [29,47,77], techniques that aim to convince people through argument
or iterative discussion, respectively, to adopt dierent strategies or choices. The
techniques for persuasion require models of the potential for dierent types of
arguments to inuence a person to change strategy. Negotiation methods require
models of people's negotiation strategies and typically require several iterations to
reach an agreement. The restructuring approach we present in this paper requires
neither these complex models of people nor repeated interactions.
Research in multi-agent systems has produced a variety of types of agents
to represent and act on behalf of people, including agents that act as proxies in
trading (as in the Trading Agent Competition [91]) and buy and sell in virtual
marketplaces ([15, interalia]). Agents have also been designed for the Colored-
Trails game [26], which enables dierent negotiation and decision-making strategies
to be tested. Chalamish et al. [13] use Peer-designed agents (PDAs) for simulating
parking lots, giving evidence for some similarity between the behaviors exhibited
by people and the agents they program. Empirical investigation of the level of
similarity observed between PDAs and people in general is not conclusive: some
work suggests a relatively strong correlation between the behaviors of the two [14,
52,51], while other work reports that PDAs behave dierently [26,69].
9 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper presents novel methods for improving computer agent performance
within sequentially dependent decisions. It denes a set of restructuring heuristics
that enable platforms such as websites connecting producers and consumers of
various types, to improve the search of autonomous agents acting as proxies for
people. This kind of restructuring is useful for settings in which a platform is
not able to inuence directly the design of agent strategies but can only control
the information they obtain. The use of restructuring is completely transparent
to the decision maker, and does not require any direct interaction with her. The
method also has many benets even in situations where direct interaction with the
decision maker is possible: it saves the need to explain the optimal strategy to the
decision maker or persuade non-experts in decision making in the correctness and
optimality of that strategy. Within the scope of economic search, there are many
platforms in which users need to spend time (usually a scarce resource) in order
to reduce uncertainty about the benets (or characteristics) of dierent possible
choices or opportunities. The improvement in users' welfare (e.g., in time saved
or better decisions made) that results from problem restructuring should make a
website more appealing to users, thus increasing trac and revenues.
The research described in this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst
to dene restructuring for sequential decision making. Restructuring sequentially
dependent decision problems has signicant challenges not present in restructuring
for decisions simpliciter. In particular, the restructuring heuristics cannot eliminate
alternative opportunities simply on the basis of a single value or rules of thumb
based on certainty and variance alone. The temporal nature of sequential decisionProblem Restructuring for Better Decision Making in Recurring Decision Situations 37
making combined with uncertainty about outcomes requires some consideration
of possible futures in which the prior removal of some alternative could worsen a
decision-maker's performance. The research is novel also in focusing on improving
agent performance from the \outside", which is required because websites cannot
control the design of the agent proxies that interact with them.
The results reported in Section 7 provide a proof of concept for the possibility
of substantially improving agent performance in recurring sequential decision mak-
ing by restructuring the problem space. An extensive evaluation of the heuristics
in four dierent classes of search environments, and with both agents (for whom
they were designed) and people (to test generalization). The empirical investi-
gations involved a large number of agents, each designed by a dierent person,
and a large number of problem instances within each class. Even though it has
no information about an agent's strategy, the information hiding heuristic sub-
stantially improves average performance. Although it can degrade some individual
performance, the extent to which it does so is limited both in the level of negative
impact and the extent of agents involved. Given even a small amount of infor-
mation about an agent's prior search behavior, the adaptive heuristic is able to
increase overall average performance and lower the possible negative impact on
individual agent performance. The improvement in people's performance resulting
from use of the heuristics supports the hypothesis that people's divergence from
the theoretical-optimal strategy is caused primarily by their limited ability to ex-
tract it. Examination of the code and documentation for the agents used in our
experiments revealed that a large number of programmers used a strategy based
in some way on the means (rather than the distributions) of the opportunities,
supporting both prior work that shows people have preference for mean over dis-
tribution and that the mean-manipulation heuristic has the potential to be broadly
applicable. Interestingly, none of the agents used the optimal strategy, providing
additional, albeit weaker, evidence that this strategy is not an intuitively obvious
one.
The information hiding heuristic substantially improved the performance of
both agents and people. This result indicates that both people and agents have
diculty identifying opportunities that have a low probability of contributing to
the search process according to the theoretic-optimal solution. This result is yet
another piece of evidence that observed dierences between people's behavior and
the theoretic-optimal strategy is rooted in people's limited understanding of the
search problem rather than limitations of the payo-maximizing search model.
As reported in Section 7, the adaptive learner heuristic led to the best per-
formance for agents, but was less successful when used with people. These results
raise several issues. First, the identication of additional agent strategies for which
new restructuring heuristics are useful will increase the adaptive heuristics poten-
tial for enhancing performance, because the adaptive heuristic's architecture is
modular, allowing easy incorporation of new restructuring heuristics. Second, the
lesser improvement provided by this heuristic for people raises the question of
whether the failure to classify people's strategies results from their being less con-
sistent than agents or from their use of strategies for which the particular set of
heuristics we explored is less applicable. Finally, we note that a natural extension
the approach taken in this paper is to develop heuristics that will choose the re-
structuring method to be applied based not only on agent classication but also
on problem instance characteristics. To do so, will require a more rened analysis38 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
at the agent level. In that spirit we also suggest future work in developing eective
restructuring heuristics for people. Indeed the benet achieved with the heuristics
proposed for agents was found to be substantial also when tested with people.
Still, it is possible that specic restructuring-heuristics, ones that are designed to
take advantage of human behaviors observed in sequentially dependent decisions,
will be found to be even more eective.
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Appendix
A - Optimal search strategy for the problem with multi-rectangular distribution
functions
Nam dui ligula, fringilla a, euismod sodales, sollicitudin vel, wisi. Morbi auctor lorem non
justo. Nam lacus libero, pretium at, lobortis vitae, ultricies et, tellus. Donec aliquet, tortor sed
accumsan bibendum, erat ligula aliquet magna, vitae ornare odio metus a mi. Morbi ac orci
et nisl hendrerit mollis. Suspendisse ut massa. Cras nec ante. Pellentesque a nulla. Cum sociis
natoque penatibus et magnis dis parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. Aliquam tincidunt
urna. Nulla ullamcorper vestibulum turpis. Pellentesque cursus luctus mauris.42 Avshalom Elmalech et al.
Based on Weitzman's solution principles for the costly search problem [90] we constructed
the optimal search strategy for the multi-rectangular distribution function that was used in
our experiments (see Section 5). In multi-rectangular distribution functions, the interval is
divided into n sub intervals f(x0;x1);(x1;x2);;::;(xn 1;xn)g and the probability distribution
is given by f(x) =
Pi
xi xi 1 for xi 1 < x < xi and f(x) = 0 otherwise, (
P n
i=1Pi = 1). The
reservation value of each opportunity is calculated according to:
ci =
Z ri
y=0
(ri   y)f(y)dy (9)
Using integration by parts eventually we obtain:
ci =
Z ri
y=0
F(y) (10)
Now notice that for the multi-rectangular distribution function: F(x) =
Pj 1
i=1 Pi+Pj(x 
xi)=(xi+1   xi) where j is the rectangle that contains x and each rectangle i is dened over
the interval (xi 1;xi). Therefore we obtain:
ci =
Z ri
y=0
 j 1 X
i=0
Pi +
Pj(y   xi)
(xi+1   xi)

dy = (11)
j 1 X
k=1
Z xk
y=xk 1
 k 1 X
i=1
Pi +
Pk(y   xk 1)
xk   xk 1

dy +
Z ri
y=xj 1
 j 1 X
i=1
Pi +
Pj(y   xj 1)
xj   xj 1

dy =
j 1 X
k=1

(xk   xk 1)
k 1 X
i=1
Pi +
Pk((xk)2   2xkxk 1   (xk 1)2 + 2(xk 1)2)
2(xk   xk 1)

+
(ri   xj 1)
j 1 X
i=1
Pi +
Pj((ri)2   2rixj 1   (xj 1)2 + 2(xj 1)2)
2(xj   xj 1)
=
j 1 X
k=1

(xk   xk 1)
k 1 X
i=1
Pi +
Pk(xk   xk 1)
2

+ (ri   xj 1)
j 1 X
i=1
Pi +
Pj(ri   xj 1)2
2(xj   xj 1)
From the above equation we can extract ri which is the reservation value of opportunity
i.
B - Interesting strategies
Among the more interesting strategies, in the set of agents received, one may nd:
{ Use a threshold for the sum of the costs incurred so far for deciding whether to query the
next server associated with the lowest expected queue length or terminate search.
{ Querying servers from the subset of servers in the 10-th percentile, according to server's
variance, from highest to lowest, and terminating if these are all queried or if a value that
is lower than the mean of all remaining servers in the set was obtained.
{ Querying the server with the smallest expected waiting time. Then, if the value obtained
is at least 20% higher than the second minimal expected query time then querying the
latter, and otherwise terminating the exploration process and assigning the job to the rst
queried server (i.e., querying at most two servers).
{ Sorting the servers by their highest probability mass rectangle and querying the server for
which that rectangle is dened over the smallest interval. Than sequentially querying all
the servers according to their sum of expected queue length and querying cost until none
of the remaining servers are associated with a sum smaller than the best value found so
far.
{ Querying the rst out of the subset of servers associated with the minimum sum of querying
cost and expected value. If the value received for the rst is greater than its expected value
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{ Sorting the servers by their expected value and querying cost sum. Querying according to
the sum, from the lowest to highest, and terminating unless the probability that the next
to be queried will yield a value lower than the best found so far is at least 60%.
{ Sorting the servers by their expected value and querying cost sum. Querying according to
the sum, from the lowest to highest, and terminating unless the dierence between the sum
of the next to be queried and the rst that was queried is less than a pre-set threshold.
{ Querying the server that its variance is the lowest among the group of 30% of the servers
that are associated with the lowest expected value.